Distrust in the American Nuclear Umbrella
At a recent meeting of top foreign ministry officials from several European countries, no one raised their hand when asked if they believed the United States would defend them if attacked. This lack of confidence indicates that European governments have concluded the U.S. is no longer a reliable ally for NATO security.
Over the past 18 months, conversations in Brussels and other NATO capitals have focused on boosting conventional defense to compensate for Washington’s retrenchment. However, a quieter discussion is also underway regarding the status of the U.S. nuclear guarantee.
Washington proposes a new division of labor where Europeans take primary responsibility for conventional defense while the U.S. ensures nuclear defense. Officials argue this arrangement does not address the loss of trust in Article 5 commitments.
The Collapse of the Post-War Bargain
The current uncertainty marks the end of a long-standing agreement. During the "Great Debate" led by French strategist Raymond Aron, European leaders feared Washington’s emphasis on conventional defense reflected reluctance to protect Europe with nuclear weapons, especially as Moscow developed missiles capable of reaching the U.S. homeland.
The Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik created a dilemma for NATO as Europeans feared the U.S. would no longer use nuclear weapons to prevent invasion once Moscow demonstrated intercontinental rocket capabilities. One American idea that gained traction during this period was creating a multilateral force—a fleet of vessels carrying approximately 200 missiles—to give Europeans ownership and control over nuclear deterrence.
The debate was resolved through a grand bargain where European countries forgo developing nuclear weapons in exchange for increased participation in U.S. nuclear decision-making. This bargain held for 60 years but has now come undone.
Proposals for a New Nuclear Framework
As the old framework dissolves, some European capitals are quietly considering acquiring their own nuclear weapons. France has offered to adapt its nuclear policy to help defend its European allies.
Former U.S. NATO ambassador Ivo Daalder argues that Europe’s scramble to shore up conventional defense risks overlooking its greatest security weakness: nuclear deterrence. He proposes a fourth alternative: a renewed U.S.-European nuclear bargain with a real European core, led by France and the United Kingdom, to take on a larger role in nuclear deterrence and restore the transatlantic defense link.