Epistemological Fault Lines in China Policy
The academic and policy community remains divided on the fundamental question of what China wants, with no consensus emerging despite extensive research. According to an October 21, 2026, report by East Asia Forum, the disagreement is not merely about data or methods but represents a deeper epistemological struggle involving competing convictions and geopolitical perspectives.
This divide was highlighted in August 2025 when the journal International Security published an article titled "What Does China Want?" by authors Dave Kang, Jackie Wong, and Zenobia Chan. The researchers concluded that China is a status quo power with limited global aims rather than a revisionist state seeking to overturn the international order.
The publication of their findings prompted four critical responses in the same journal issue, all of which focused on methodological issues regarding how intent is measured and interpreted. Among these critiques, Rush Doshi, a former senior policy advisor in the Biden administration, provided the most developed counter-argument to Kang, Wong, and Chan’s conclusions.
Conflicting Methodologies and Evidence
Kang, Wong, and Chan based their assessment on an analysis of 12,000 official Chinese articles and hundreds of speeches by President Xi Jinping. From this textual data, they determined that Beijing does not intend to become a global hegemon.
Doshi challenged this approach in his critique, arguing that the authors drew incorrect conclusions by "cherry-picking" from a narrow selection of sources. He further asserted that Kang, Wong, and Chan treated the absence of evidence for aggressive intent as evidence of absence, a logical flaw that Doshi claims obscures the true nature of China’s strategic goals.
Doshi’s perspective aligns with his 2021 book, The Long Game, in which he concluded that Beijing has pursued a long-term strategy to displace U.S. influence both regionally and globally. He argues that assessments of Chinese intentions must incorporate behavior, such as military clashes with neighboring countries, rather than relying solely on official rhetoric.
Capabilities vs. Rhetoric
A central point of contention is the relationship between stated intent and material capability. While Kang, Wong, and Chan focus on diplomatic language, other analysts emphasize physical power. China’s capabilities are described as real, including a growing nuclear arsenal, an enormous navy, and substantial military spending.
Doshi contends that these growing capabilities have altered China’s operational tempo and increased its risk tolerance. He suggests that the discrepancy between Beijing’s stated status-quo preferences and its aggressive actions in its neighborhood indicates a more revisionist posture than Kang et al. acknowledge.
Psychology and Perception in Geopolitics
The debate also touches on the psychological factors that influence how nations perceive each other’s intentions. Robert Jervis has previously examined the role of psychology in shaping U.S. misperceptions of the Soviet Union’s malign intentions during the Cold War, providing a historical parallel for current anxieties about China.
Skeptics of the status-quo interpretation argue that Beijing may be concealing its true intentions. This position presents a challenge for empirical verification, as skeptics maintain that no amount of positive evidence can disprove the claim that China is hiding its revisionist goals.
Conversely, those who view China as a status quo power argue that taking Chinese statements at face value is the most rational approach. The ongoing disagreement underscores the difficulty of assessing national intent in an era where military expansion and diplomatic rhetoric may serve different strategic purposes.