A Shift in Moscow’s Strategic Priorities
Dmitry Adamsky, a professor at Reichman University and an associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, has identified a significant transformation in Russian strategic thinking over the past year. According to Adamsky, Russia now considers Europe, rather than the United States, to be its primary geopolitical adversary.
This assessment marks a departure from the Kremlin’s posture during the initial stages of the conflict in Ukraine. In 2022, Moscow viewed the United States as its principal rival and regarded Europe and NATO largely as an extension of American power. The current analysis suggests that after nearly five years of war and 22 months into the second Trump administration, this dynamic has fundamentally altered.
Adamsky notes that Moscow now attributes new strategic agency to European nations. This shift is driven by what Russian officials perceive as dramatic military modernization across many European countries and a growing interest among some European leaders in developing or extending their own nuclear deterrents.
The "Castling" Doctrine and Non-Nuclear Deterrence
Consequently, Russia’s defense establishment has begun advocating for a strategic approach referred to as "castling." This concept involves the repositioning of forces and resources to optimize the state’s strategic posture against its identified primary threats.
Within this framework, Moscow argues that European countries have become the principal source of Ukraine’s military capacity, political resolve, and strategic resilience. Russian officials contend that Europe has effectively made Ukraine its proxy in the ongoing conflict.
To counter this perceived threat, Moscow asserts it must direct coercive pressure toward Europe’s elites, decision-making centers, and critical infrastructure. The objective of this strategy is to instill a "deterring fear" in Europe’s calculus, thereby rebuilding Russian credible deterrence for long-term competition with the West.
Adamsky highlights that Russia’s traditional understanding of nuclear coercion is giving way to new thinking regarding non-nuclear strategic deterrence. This new approach relies on advanced conventional weapons systems aimed specifically at Europe.
Continuity in Long-Term Objectives
Despite the shift in identifying Europe as the primary adversary, Russia’s overarching strategic goals remain consistent with those articulated by President Vladimir Putin at the time of the 2022 invasion. These objectives include banning NATO enlargement to Ukraine and other former Soviet republics.
The changes in Russian strategic thinking have gained prominence among influential defense intellectuals and policy experts close to the Kremlin over the past year. This evolution in perspective is expected to influence how Russia approaches the confrontation with the West and efforts to end the war in Ukraine.